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Young: Nix v. Whiteside: Is a Client's Intended Perjury a Real Dilemma

NIX v. WHITESIDE: IS A CLIENT'S INTENDED
PERJURY A REAL DILEMMA?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts, legal scholars, and law students have long grappled with the
complex issues that arise when a criminal defense attorney' is faced with
a client who intends to perjure himself on the stand.2 The ethical dilemma has been unanimously described as one of the most difficult and
controversial problems presently facing attorneys.3 The controversy
arises from the conflicting ethical obligations of the attorney to the court 4
and to the client.5 The criminal defense attorney confronted with a client
intending to commit perjury6 must make a difficult choice, and each alternative is fraught with possible disciplinary consequences. The attorney who elects to reveal that his client plans to offer perjured testimony
may compromise his client's due process right to effective assistance of
1. Many sources discuss client perjury in contexts other than criminal defense. However, this
Note will only discuss a criminal defense attorney's obligations when dealing with intended client
perjury. For a general discussion of client perjury in adversary litigation, see Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809 (1977). See also Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v.
Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976) (wherein the court discusses the duties of an attorney regarding
deposition perjury of a client).
2. The debate over the obligations of an attorney when dealing with client perjury dates back
to a controversial article by Monroe H. Freedman. See Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the
CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). For current articles discussing the Nix v. Whiteside case, see MacCarthy & Mejia, The PerjuriousClient
Question: Putting CriminalDefense Lawyers Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 1197 (1984); Rieger, Client Perjury: A ProposedResolution of the Constitutionaland
Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1985).
3. In Maddox v. State the court stated, "[t]he problem of representing a defendant who insists
on testifying falsely has been called, correctly, one of the hardest questions a criminal defense lawyer
faces." 613 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). This case also serves as a good illustration of
how an attorney establishes a foundation for the "free narrative" option provided for under Model
Rule 3.3. Id. at 277.
4. "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law" MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. "In his representations of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence." Id. at DR 7-102 (A)(4) (emphasis added).
5. Canon 4 states that "[a] Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client"
Id. at Canon 4.
6. Perjury is defined as: "the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence ... upon oath ... such
assertion being material to the issue or point of inquiry and known to such witness to be false."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (5th ed. 1979).
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counsel7 or his right to testify. The attorney who, in the alternative,

chooses to remain silent risks facing disciplinary charges for assisting in
the presentation of false evidence.'

Faced with such an impossible choice, the attorney should be able to
turn to the professional guidance of the courts and fellow attorneys. Unfortunately, the problem has stirred debate among attorneys 9 and has not

yet been resolved in the courts, 10 leaving ambiguous and conflicting

guidelines for the attorney. Particularly perplexing is a reading of White-

side v. Scurr,II in which the court praised a colleague for abiding by the
ethical guidelines promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA)

but nevertheless, found that the client was deprived of his right to effec2

tive assistance of counsel by the attorney's actions.1
The journey of Emanuel Charles Whiteside's case through the legal

system is a case study of the competing ethical obligations of confidentiality and candor to the court. The United States Supreme Court recently

decided Nix v. Whiteside,'3 a final resolution of Whiteside's case which
offers the attorney long-awaited guidance. The Court determined that

the primary goal of a trial is to be the search for truth,' 4 and resolved the
competing interests in order to serve that goal.
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES).
8. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at DR 7-102(A)(4).
9. The following is a list of articles discussing the general issues of client perjury: Brazil,
Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and Constitutional Law,
44 Mo. L. REV. 601 (1979); Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1493 (1966); Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution
and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 11 (1966); Erickson, The Perjurious
Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court
and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75 (1981); Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury:
Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1978); Noonan, The Purposes
ofAdvocacy and the Limits ofConfidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); Comment, The Perjury
Dilemma in an Adversary System, 82 DIcK. L. REV. 545 (1978).
10. Courts debating client perjury issues tend to favor the more stringent approach of the
Model Rules. See United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1374 (1986); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd on remand, 398 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. 1968); Dodd v. Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1960).
11. 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984).
12. Id. at 1327-28. The court found that counsel "conscientiously attempt[ed] to address the
problem of client perjury in a manner consistent with professional responsibility" but held that
Robinson's threat to disclose proposed perjury constituted a violation of Whiteside's right to elfcctive assistance of counsel and his constitutional right of receiving due process. Id. at 1329-30.
13. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). "[T]he responsibility of an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court
and a key component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for truth ..... * Id. at 998.
14. Id. at 997.
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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Late at night on February 8, 1977, in Cedar Springs, Iowa, Whiteside and two others went to the apartment of Calvin Love to purchase
some marijuana. Whiteside and his companions found Love in bed. An
argument broke out concerning the marijuana. Love instructed his girlfriend to get his "piece," he then got up and returned to bed. Later, at
trial, Whiteside testified that Love began to reach under his pillow and
move toward Whiteside.'" Whiteside, fearing that his life was in danger,
"stabbed Love in the chest, inflicting a fatal wound."' 6 Whiteside was
formally charged with Love's murder. The court appointed Gary L.
Robinson as the attorney to represent Whiteside. After some investigation and inquiry, Robinson learned that Whiteside had believed Love was
reaching for a gun hidden under the pillow, but that Whiteside had never
actually seen a gun. A police search of Love's apartment did not turn up
companions recalled seeing a gun at the
a gun, and neither of Whiteside's
7
incident.1
the
of
scene
Robinson advised his client that the claim of self-defense required
only a belief that Love had a gun nearby, and therefore did not require
the claim that the gun actually existed. Whiteside then informed Robinson that he would testify that he saw "something metallic" in Love's
hand. Whiteside reasoned that "[i]f I don't say I saw a gun I'm dead."'"
This statement indicates that Whiteside believed he had to support his
claim of self-defense even with fabricated testimony in order to have a
chance of acquittal. Robinson admonished Whiteside, telling him that
such testimony was perjury and reiterated that actual proof of a gun was
unnecessary. Robinson also counseled Whiteside that, as an officer of the
court, he could not allow perjured testimony and would be forced to
withdraw from the case if Whiteside insisted on presenting perjured
testimony. 19
Whiteside testified on his own behalf without perjuring himself, and
the jury returned a verdict of second degree murder. Whiteside moved
for a new trial, pro se, claiming inadequate assistance of counsel. The
trial court denied his motion.2 ° On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa
15. Id. at 991.

16. Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 992.
Id.
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affirmed Whiteside's conviction.2 1 Thereafter, the United States District

Court denied Whiteside's writ of habeas corpus. 2 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later reversed the district court
and granted the writ.2 3 Finally, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to decide whether the sixth amendment right of a

criminal defendant to assistance of counsel is violated when an attorney
refuses to cooperate with the defendant in presenting intended perjured
testimony at trial."24
III.
A.

LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE

Ethical Considerations

1. The Conflict
This ethical dilemma has its roots in the ambiguous and contradictory language of the codes and standards of professional conduct.2 5 The
codes place a high value on an attorney's professional obligation to the
court 6 and his obligations to preserve attorney-client confidentiality.2 7

An attorney who violates either obligation is subject to the possibility of

disciplinary action.2 8 If a client confides in his attorney that he will tes21. Id. "[T]he right to have counsel present all appropriate defenses does not extend to using
perjury, and that an attorney's duty to a client does not extend to assisting a client in committing
perjury." Id. (paraphrasing State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (1978)).
22. Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 992. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
"concluded that there could be no grounds for habeas relief since there is no constitutional right to
present a perjured defense." Id.
23. "[The Eighth Circuit reversed and directed that the writ of habeas corpus be granted on
the grounds that an attorney's threat to disclose his client's proposed perjury constituted a violation
of his client's due process rights to effective representation and a violation of the attorney's ethical
obligation to preserve client confidences." Id. at 992-93.
24. Id. at 991.
25. For the purpose of this Note, discussion will be limited to the MODEL CODE, supra note 4;

the

MODEL RULES, supra note 7; the STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979) [hereinafter DEFENSE STANDARDS]; and THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF

CONDUCT (Roscoe Pound-American Lawyer's Foundation, Revised Draft, May 1982) [hereinafter
ATLA CODE]. For an overview of the ATLA CODE, see Comment, Lying Clients and Legal Ethics:
The Attorney's Unsolved Dilemma, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 500-04 (1983).
26. MODEL CODE, supra note 4.
27. Id.
28. The attorney may be subject to reprimand, suspension, or disbarment for using perjured
testimony or false evidence, MODEL CODE, su1pra note 4, at DR 7-102(A)(4); for assisting his client
in fraudulent or illegal conduct (perjury), id. at DR 7-102(A)(7); for offering evidence that the attorney knows to be false, MODEL Rui.Fs, supra note 7, at Rule 3.3(a)(4); and for disclosing attorneyclient confidences, MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at Canon 4, DR 4-101(B)(l)-(3), or MODEn. RUi..s,
supra note 7, at Rules 1.6(a) and 1.16. Rule 8.4 subjects an attorney to punishment for violating the
rules of professional conduct; for engaging in fraudulent, dishonest or deceitful conduct; and for
engaging in conduct that prejudices the administration of justice. MODI*. RUL.S, supra note 7. lit
Rule 8.4(a), (c), (d).
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tify falsely, the attorney must struggle with the choice of honoring his
obligation to the court or protecting his client's confidences.
The difficult choice sets up a competition between two underlying
social interests of the legal system. Some advocate a truth seeking system
(Truth Seekers),29 and others advocate an adversarial system (Adversaries).3" The Truth Seekers maintain that perjury is repugnant to the purpose of a trial and that it therefore falls outside of the domain of
attorney-client confidentiality.3 1 The Adversaries claim that only by protecting the adversary system through strictly guarding attorney-client
confidentiality will the rights of the client be safeguarded.32 An examination of the rules on professional ethics shows that the Model Code espouses the position of the Adversaries, whereas the more recent Model
Rules support the viewpoint of the Truth Seekers. The Roscoe PoundAmerican Trial Lawyer's foundation commissioned a new code on professional responsibility in response to the new Truth Seekers oriented
Model Rules. Entitled as the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct,3 3 the
new code retains attorney-client confidence as the first principle of being
a lawyer.3 4 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Nix v. Whiteside attacked a weakness in the argument of the Adversaries and resolved the
conflict in favor of the Truth Seekers.
2.

The Attorney's Standards of Conduct

The ABA has published three sets of rules by which an attorney
should govern his conduct: the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
(Model Code), the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules),
and the StandardsRelating to the Administration of CriminalJustice (De3 5 Many legal commentators have pointed out the lack
fense Standards).
of guidance and inherent contradictions these standards provide.36 Perhaps the strongest message to lawyers from the ABA can be inferred
29. See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
'[T]he basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth ... and ... 'the right result' as not
" Id. at 1033 (citations omitted).
merely 'basic' but 'the sole objective of the judge ....
30. See Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975). "A trial
is, in part, a search for truth.... We are concerned, however, with far more than a search for truth,
and the constitutional rights that are provided by our system of justice serve independent values that
may well outweigh the truth-seeking value .... " Id. at 1063.
31. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945). "All perjured relevant testimony is at war with
justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth." Id. at 227.
32. See Freedman, supra note 30, at 1063-64.
33. ATLA CODE, supra note 25.
34. Id., preface by Theodore J. Koskoff.
35. DUENS|'s STANDARDS, supra note 25.
36. See Rieger, supra note 2, at 123; MacCarthy & Mejia, supra note 2, at 1198.
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from the drastic change in emphasis from the Model Code to the Model
Rules.
The Model Code favors the position of the Adversaries by placing a
high value on the preservation of the attorney-client privilege.3 7 The
Canons, the Ethical Considerations, and the Disciplinary Rules of the
Model Code address the perjury problem as well as attorney-client confidentiality. Canon 4 states that "[a] lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."' 38 Disciplinary Rule 4-101 elucidates
Canon 4 by stating that, "a lawyer shall not knowingly ... [r]eveal a
confidence or secret of his client ...[or] ...[u]se a confidence or secret
of his client to the disadvantage of the client."'39 The attorney-client
privilege is not absolute, however, as illustrated by Disciplinary Rule 4101(C) which lists those things a lawyer may reveal.40
Canon 4 is also subject to the balancing restrictions of the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 7 that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."4 1 Disciplinary Rule 7-101 states
that a lawyer shall not "[p]rejudice or damage his client during the
course of the professional relationship."'4 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 lists
the various activities which are considered to be outside the bounds of
law. For example, a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence," or "[p]articipate in the creation or preservation
43
of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false."
A lawyer who learns that a "client has ...perpetrated a fraud upon a...
tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same." 4 If the
client refuses, the attorney must expose the fraud unless "the information
is protected as a privileged communication. '' 4 1
37. For a detailed historical and analytical discussion of the Model Code rules on disclosure,
see Callan & David, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client
Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 351-65 (1976).
38. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at Canon 4.
39. Id.at DR 4-101(B)(l)-(3).
40. A lawyer may reveal:
(1)Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a
full disclosure to them. (2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary
Rules or required by law or court order. (3) The intention of his client to commit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime. (4) Confidences or secrets necessary to
establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an
accusation of wrongful conduct.
Id. at DR 4-101(C).
41. Id. at Canon 7.
42. Id. at DR 7-10l(A)(3).
43. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(6).
44. Id. at DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis added).
45. Id.
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While it appears that an attorney clearly may not knowingly use
perjured testimony, false evidence, or create or preserve false evidence,4 6
the attorney is also forbidden from disclosing secrets and confidences
that will prejudice or damage his client.47 The attorney seems powerless
to prevent perjury, because if the defendant confides in his attorney that
he intends to commit perjury and actually gives such false testimony, the
attorney is barred by Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) from exposing the
fraud. In most instances, the defense attorney will learn of the intended
perjury through client confidences. 4 8 Thus, the exception made for information protected as a privileged communication overcomes the rule.
The rule against using perjury and false evidence appears to be limited to
knowledge obtained through private investigation outside the attorneyclient relationship.
Even though the Model Code seems to forbid putting on perjured
evidence, a closer reading of the code reveals a strong emphasis in protecting client confidences at the expense of perpetrating a fraud upon a
tribunal. Subornation of perjury is a crime in most jurisdictions.49
Whether a perjury statute supercedes the attorney-client privilege is unclear. If the attorney chooses to disclose the perjury, he risks disciplinary
conduct from the bar; but if he chooses to respect the confidence privilege, he risks charges of subornation of perjury. Unfortunately, these
rules offer little guidance to an attorney who suspects or knows that his
client will perjure himself during the trial. The question of what an attorney should do when faced with a client intending to give false testimony had, until Nix, remained unanswered.
The Model Rules address more directly than the Model Code the
problem of what an attorney should do when a client reveals his perjurious plan. For example, under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is forbidden to
"counsel a client, to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent."5 0 The official comments following
Rule 1.2 as a whole suggest this prohibition is directed more toward business transactions as opposed to courtroom candor.5 ' To protect the
uninhibited trust required in an attorney-client relationship, the Model
46. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(3), (4), (6).
47. Id. at DR 4-101(A), (B)(2).
48. See Rieger, supra note 2, at 123-24.
49. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982); ARK. STrT.ANN. § 47-2602 (1984): COi.O. RnV. STAT.
§ 18-8-502 (1973): IOWA COD § 720.3 (1985); Mo. Rrv. STvr. § 575.040 (1978); OKL.. STAT. tit.
21, §§ 491. 504 (1985).
50. Momio. RUi.iFs, supra note 7. at Rule 1.2(d).
51. Id. at comments.
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Rules, prohibit the revelation of "information relating to [the] representation of a client." 52 Nevertheless, the comments distinguish counseling

or assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct as a "special instance of the duty prescribed in Rule 1.2(d)." 53 In the event the client is
using the attorney's representation to perpetrate crime or fraud, or this

representation will result in a violation of the Model Rules, the rules
mandate declining proffered employment or terminating existing employ-

ment.54 Sometimes the situation can become highly strained when the
tribunal declines counsel's withdrawal request." The above-cited rules
focus on the relationship between the attorney and the client in a nonadversarial position. It is quite clear, however, that these rules strongly

speak out against a lawyer's participation in criminal or fraudulent acts.
The motif continues in the rules governing the attorney-client relationship in an adversarial situation. Rule 3.3 speaks directly to a law-

yer's ethical obligation to be candid with the court.

6

"A lawyer shall

not knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a law-

yer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." 57 More simply put, a
lawyer must not knowingly offer false evidence. For example, a lawyer
cannot put on false alibi testimony regardless of his client's wishes.5 8
The comments specifically single out the issue of perjury by a criminal
defendant and recommend a course of conduct.
When an attorney confronts a criminal defendant intending to per-

jure himself, the lawyer must try "to persuade the client to refrain from
perjurious testimony."5 9 In Nix, Robinson's efforts to persuade his client
to refrain were successful, creating a relatively simple issue on ethics for

the appellate court. The real dilemma begins when persuasion fails and
52. Id. at Rule 1.6(a). "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation ... " Id. The client confidentiality rule is balanced against the usual exceptions concerning criminal acts and personal defenses against criminal
charges and civil claims. Id. at Rule 1.6(b).
53. Id. at comments (Disclosure Adverse to Client).
54. Id. at Rule 1.16(a)(1), (b)(1)(2).
55. Id. at Rule 1.16(c). While the Model Rules suggest the alternative of withdrawal, a trial
court is most likely to deny an attorney's request to withdraw. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575
F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 234, 468 P.2d 136, 139 (1970); Maddox
v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
56. Id. at Rule 3.3.
57. Id. at Rule 3.3(a)(4). The term "remedial measures" is discussed in the comment "Remedial Measures" following the statement of the rule.
58. Id. at Rule 3.3 comment (False Evidence).
59. Id. at Rule 3.3 comment (Perjury by a Criminal Defendant).
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withdrawal is not possible.6" The Model Rules list three proposed resolutions to this dilemma: (1) permit the accused to give a narrative without
guidance from the lawyer; (2) excuse the attorney from the ethical obligation to reveal the perjury; and (3) require the attorney to reveal the
perjury on the grounds that a criminal defendant does not have a right to
assistance of counsel in committing perjury. 6 ' The Model Rules disfavor
withdrawal because it merely prolongs the problem instead of resolving
it.6" Should the attorney elect to reveal the alleged perjury, the Model
Rules suggest giving the client an opportunity to controvert his attorney's statement.63 To further complicate the issue, the Model Rules warn
that to reveal the client's perjury may infringe on the criminal defendant's constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of
counsel.
The Model Rules also demand a level of fairness and honesty between opposing parties. 4 Rule 3.4(b) states that "a lawyer shall not
falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely ....,65 The
purpose of this rule is to ensure fair competition in the adversarial system.6 6 The drafters of the Model Rules essentially repeated the rule
stated in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6). Allowing the defendant to testify falsely violates the attorney's obligation to put on a fair and honest
defense.
While the Model Rules clearly place a much stronger emphasis on
the truth seeking purpose of a trial, the rules provide little actual guidance for the practicing attorney. The attorney attempting to follow the
rules would soon find himself faced with conflicting obligations.
The Model Rules at least recognize the dilemma posed by the earlier
Model Code and attempt to give an attorney some guidance. The Model
Rules strongly support disclosure of intended client perjury over the
preservation of attorney-client confidentiality, as long as the defendant's
constitutional rights are not compromised. Although the Model Rules
do not suggest what action may infringe on a defendant's rights, they are
at least a positive step toward giving guidance to a criminal defense attorney facing a perjurious client.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at Rule 3.3 comment (Remedial Measures).
at Rule 3.4.
at Rule 3.4(b).
at Rule 3.4 comment.
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The ABA has also approved a set of standards which serve to pro67
vide more specific guidance for the administration of criminal justice.
Defense Standard 4-7.7 unequivocally states, "it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid" to perjury or use perjured testimony."
The Defense Standardspermit a lawyer to withdraw from representation
if feasible and allowed by the court.6 9 When the court will not grant the
request of the attorney to withdraw, the Defense Standards favor the
"free narrative" option of the Model Rules. 70 The Defense Standards
recommend the following procedure: (1) make a record that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of his attorney; (2) identify the
witness as the defendant; (3) ask only those questions which the attorney
believes the defendant will answer truthfully; (4) do not ask those questions which the attorney believes will be answered perjuriously; and (5)
ask the defendant if he has any additional statements to make for the
court. 7 By following this procedure, the attorney disassociates himself
from the perjured testimony and signals to the judge his belief that the
defendant is not telling the truth. The rule also forbids making any reference to the free narrative of the defendant during closing argument.72
Unfortunately, Defense Standard 4-7.7 existed only as a passing
spectre in the law.73 The standard was first approved by the ABA House
of Delegates in 1971, was deleted from the approved draft in February,
1979, and was subsequently scheduled for consideration by the ABA
Special Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards.7 4 As
of this writing, the final fate and form of proposed standard 4-7.7 remains
unknown and the standard is noticeably absent. Even though the corpus
of 4-7.7 was put to rest long ago, its spirit lives on in many recent cases
67. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 25. For in depth discussion of the Defense Standards,
see Edwards, A Comparison of the First and Second Editions of the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, 59 DEN. L.J. 25, 34-36 (1981); Erickson, supra note 9, at 82-84.
68. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 25, at Rule 4-7.7(c). It should be noted that Rule 4-7.7
also requires counsel to "strongly discourage" perjured testimony before taking further action. Id. at
Rule 4-7.7(a).
69. Id. at Rule 4-7.7(b).
70. Id. at Rule 4-7.7(c).
71. Id. For a criticism of this procedure, see Vickrey, Tell it Only to the Judge: Disclosure of
Client Confidences Under the ABA Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, 60 N.D.L. REV. 261 (1984).
72. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 25, at Rule 4-7.7(c).
73. Defense Standard 4-7.7 received approval by the ABA Standing Committee on Association
Standards for Criminal Justice but was not enacted by the ABA House of Delegates during their
February, 1979 meeting. Id. The ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards will
determine the resolution of Standard 4-7.7. Id.
74. Id.; see also Rieger, supra note 2, at 126 n.28; MacCarthy & Mejia, supra note 2, at 1200
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and scholarly writings.
Until the ABA resurrects Defense Standard4-7.7, the Truth Seekers
will have to rely on 4-7.5.76 Defense Standard 4-7.5 merely echoes the
provisions of the Model Code and Model Rules. While the standard
states that "[it is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer knowingly to offer

false evidence ... or fail to seek withdrawal,

'77

it fails to give the attor-

ney the guidance of 4-7.7 when the request for withdrawal is rejected.

Defense Standards4-7.5 and 4-1. 1(C) 78 clearly demonstrate that the ABA
now favors the position of the Truth Seekers.
In response to the change of emphasis of the ABA in the Model
Rules and Defense Standards,the Adversaries banded together and produced a code of ethics protecting the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege. 79 The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (ATLA Code) opens
with rules on attorney-client confidences.8 0 The ATLA Code places such

a high value on attorney-client confidences that the longstanding rule
requiring an attorney to reveal a confidence when disclosure is necessary
to prevent imminent danger to human life exists only as a supplemental

rule.81 Even the briefest review of the rules governing client perjury reflects the philosophy that protecting attorney-client confidences is essen-

tial to safeguarding the rights of the client.8"
The pertinent ATLA Code sections on client perjury are Rules 1.2,
3.7, and 6.6. Rule 3.7 proscribes a lawyer from knowingly presenting
materially false evidence. 3 A lawyer reading this rule alone would con75. For recent cases, see United States v. Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980); Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 280-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 433 n.3 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
76. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 25, at Rule 4-7.5(a).
77. Id.
78. Id. at Rule 4-1.1(c). "The defense lawyer.., is subject to standards of conduct stated in
statutes, rules, decisions of courts, and codes, canons, or other standards of professional conduct.
The defense lawyer has no duty to execute any directive of the accused which does not comport with
law or such standards. . . " Id.

79. ATLA CODE, supra note 25. The American Bar Association's "Evaluation of Professional
Standards" "demanded from us a viable alternative code." Id. Chairmen's Introduction.
80. Id. at Chapter I "The Client's Trust and Confidences."
81. Id. The drafters of the ATLA Code proposed Rule 1.6 which states, "a lawyer may reveal
a client's confidence when ... divulgence is necessary to prevent imminent danger to human life."
Id. The Commission did not approve this rule, however, Rule 1.6 exists as a supplemental rule
because so many members supported it. Id., ed. note.
82. Id. The drafters of the ATLA Code openly state that their code is more protective of client
confidentiality than the ABA Codes, Canons, and Rules. "The Rules to this Chapter are more
protective of confidentiality than the Code of Professional Responsibility or the A.B.A. Commission's Rules." Id., Chapter I, comment.
83. Id. at Rule 3.7. "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... present materially false evidence, or
make a materially false representation to a court .
ld.
I..."
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elude that he must prevent his client from lying on the stand. The rule
does not suggest how this could be accomplished. The rule goes on to
say that the lawyer may be required to present false evidence to avoid a
"direct or indirect divulgence of a client's confidence." 4 Rule 1.2 also
qualifies the lawyer's option to withdraw to prevent a violation of the
Model Code. Indeed, a comment following the chapter on withdrawal
states that, "Rule 6.6 is not absolute, because the duty it embodies... is
sometimes subordinate to the paramountduty not to reveal clients' confidences." 6 Rules 3.7, 1.2, and 6.6 make it clear that an attorney's ethical
duty to maintain the confidence of his client is the highest duty.
B. Prior Case Law
One facet of the dilemma is the attorney's competing obligations to
be candid to the court and to maintain the confidentiality of the client's
revelations. But, as the Adversaries are quick to point out, the decision
of the attorney has consequences which may adversely affect the client's
constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel.
The Model Rules warn the attorney that ethical duties "may be qualified
by constitutional provisions for due process and the right to counsel in
criminal cases."8 7 The Model Rules also concede that constitutional requirements are superior to ethical obligations of an attorney.8 8 Having
looked at how the codes try to offer guidance, the background will be
rounded off with a review of: (1) the case law on professional ethics; (2)
the development of the right to testify; and (3) the present standard of
review for reasonably effective assistance of counsel.
1. Ethics Cases
The United States Supreme Court has noted that most courts confronted with the client purjury dilemma have "insisted on a more rigor84. Id.
85. Id. at Rule 1.2. "A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly reveal a confidence of a client or
former client .... " Id. The drafters of the ATLA Code provide two illustrative cases on this point.
In the first case, a lawyer who has learned that his client intends to give false testimony follows the
"free narrative" option of Model Rule 3.3. The drafters of the ATLA Code state that doing so is a
violation of confidence because it indirectly reveals to the judge that the defendant lied. In the
second case, a lawyer does not withdraw, presents his client's testimony, and refers to it in summation. The drafters of the ATLA Code would not consider this a disciplinary violation. Id. Illustrative Cases l(i) and 10).
86. Id. Chapter VI; comment (emphasis added).
87. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, at Rule 3.3 comment.
88. Id.
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ous standard" than those suggested by the codes. 9 Federal and state
courts have consistently held that presenting false evidence at trial not
only violates a lawyer's professional duty, but also erodes the integrity of
the adversarial system. 90 To protect the purpose of the trial process, the
law should be clear that false testimony must be barred. 9 The ethical
standards of the defense attorney to zealously represent his client cannot

be construed to compromise "the truth finding goal of our legal
2
'9

system."
Two cases, United States v. Curtis93 and McKissick v. United
States,94 have recently spelled out the position of the Truth Seekers. In
each case, counsel refused to allow false testimony9 5 because ethical re-

sponsibilities obligated the attorney to refrain from knowingly putting on
false testimony. 96 The courts held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to testify falsely and supported the decision of the attorneys to prevent the perpetration of false evidence.97 These decisions
support the proposition that the supreme goal of a trial is to ascertain the
truth and that an attorney's ethical obligation of candor toward the court
is superior to attorney-client privileges.

The opposite conclusion is reached in Whiteside v. Scurr,98 which
represents the position of the Adversaries. In Whiteside, counsel for the

defendant persuaded his client not to testify falsely by threatening to inform the court about the perjury and to withdraw.9 9 The Eighth Circuit
held that the threat to "tell or withdraw" violated attorney-client confi89. Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 996 n.6.
90. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981); People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11-12 (Colo. 1981) (citations omitted).
91. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971); United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 106
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1986).
92. Schultheis, 638 P.2d at 12.
93. 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 1374 (1986).
94. 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967).
95. In Curtis, the defendant wanted to call witnesses to testify falsely about an alibi. 742 F.2d
1072. The attorney would not put the witnesses on the stand because he knew their testimony would
be false. Id. at 1073. The attorney also refused to allow his client to testify because he knew it would
be fabricated testimony. Id. In McKissick, the attorney for McKissick told the judge that "McKissick... called me by telephone... [and] ...admitted the fact that he had pejured himself at trial
....
379 F.2d at 758. The attorney was granted a mistrial and withdrew from representation. Id.
at 757-58. The court stated that the attorney was obligated to disclose the pejury for the good of
judicial administration and to protect the public. Id. at 761 & n.2. The McKissick case also serves as
a good example of how withdrawal leads to redundant trials and constitutional issues of double
jeopardy.
96. See Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1074; McKissick, 379 F.2d at 761.
97. Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1076; McKissick, 379 F.2d at 762.
98. 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rey'd, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
99. Id. at 1326.
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dences and compromised the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel. 10o
An earlier case, United States ex reL Wilcox v. Johnson,' 0' also favors the protection of attorney-client confidences. Wilcox's attorney did
not allow her client to testify because she believed his testimony would be
false.' 0 2 If the court had permitted Wilcox to testify, his attorney
threatened to withdraw on the grounds that any passive involvement
with putting on false testimony would be unethical.'0 3 The court held
that an attorney must have a firm factual basis to support any disclosure
of proposed client perjury.o Otherwise, the disclosure violates the ethi-

cal obligations of the attorney to represent his client zealously. 05 "It is
the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts, not that of the attor-

ney."' 1 6 To allow the attorney to disclose client confidences because the
attorney merely believes the information to be false "would undermine a
07
cornerstone" of our criminal justice system.'

It is clear from these decisions that there is no uniform consensus on
how to treat the client perjury issue. State courts are also divided over
the manner in which the dilemma should be resolved.' 0 8 There is some
agreement, though, that the issue of client perjury affects the constitu-

tional rights of the criminal defendant. Indeed, the client perjury issue is
invariably connected with the issue of whether the attorney's choice of

conduct violates the constitutional rights of the defendant to effective
assistance of counsel and the right to testify.
2.

Right to Testify

While the criminal defendant's right to testify is a recent addition to
due process, 10 9 it does have a long history."' The fifth, sixth, and four100. Id. at 1328; see also Callan & David, supra note 37, at 365-77.
101. 555 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir. 1977).
102. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 122.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981); State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468
P.2d 136 (1970); but see Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
109. Nix, 106 S.Ct. at 993.
110. Id. The right to testify on your own behalf began as the right to be heard. For a discussion
of the history of the right to be heard, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 572-95 (1961). The
Supreme Court recognized the right to be heard early in history: Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274,
277 (1876); Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368-69 (1873); and McVeigh v. United States, 78
U.S. (I1 Wall.) 259, 267 (1870). See Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitu.
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teenth "' amendments are the often cited sources of the defendant's right

to testify.112 The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments better support the right than does the language of the sixth amend14

ment. 1

3

The elasticity of the due process clause expands the concept'

of which rights people consider "basic to a free society.""' 5 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, on the other hand, must be
strained to create an independent right to testify on one's own behalf.116
Today, the right to testify is considered a personal constitutional
right to the defendant' 1 7 and "a fundamental element of due process of
law.""' Although the Supreme Court has not squarely held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify, 1 9 modem cases suggest that the Court favors the right.' 2 ° In In re Oliver,1 21 the Court
stated that the right of a defendant to offer testimony was "basic in our
system of jurisprudence."' 12 2 Almost twenty-five years later, the Court in
Harris v. New York,' 2 3 stated, in passing, that "[e]very criminal defend''
ant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. l24
More recently, in Faretta v. California,'2 5 the Court, again in dictum,
stated that the right of the defendant to testify on his own behalf is "essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process."' 126 The historical context of the due process clause combined with the favorable
tional Guaranteein Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 713, 747-49 (1976); Popper, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 454.
111. U.S. CONsr. amend. V, VI, XIV § 1.
112. Rieger, supra note 2, at 136-37.
113. Id. at 137.
114. Id. at 137 n.95.
115. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (overruling Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
116. Rieger, supra note 2, at 136-37.
117. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit held "that a
defendant's personal constitutional right to testify truthfully in his own behalf may not be waived by
counsel as a matter of trial strategy." Id. at 1076 (emphasis added). See Rieger, supra note 2, at 142
& n.117.
118. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
119. Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 993.
120. For federal decisions, see United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); Hollenbeck v.
Estelle, 672 F.2d 451, 452-53 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019 (1982); and United States ex rel.
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1977); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 996 (1979). For state decisions, see People v. Schultheis, 638
P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981); People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710 (1970); State v.
Noble, 514 P.2d 460 (Ariz. 1973); and State v. Rosillo, 281 N.W.2d 877, 878-79 (Minn. 1979).
121. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
122. Id. at 273.
123. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
124. Id. at 225; see United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969).
125. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
126. Id. at 819 n.15.
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comments of the Supreme Court support the conclusion that the right of
the criminal defendant to testify is basic to current American
jurisprudence.

While the Supreme Court has only acknowledged in dictum a criminal defendant's due process right to testify, the federal circuit courts and

state courts have expressly held that the right to testify is inherent in our
concept of due process. 127 In United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 28

the court held that, "a criminal defendant's right to testify in his own
defense is of such fundamental importance"' 129 that a defendant could
insist upon testifying over his attorney's advice.' 3° A similar stand has
been adopted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
3
and several state supreme courts.1 '
3.

Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

The United States Supreme Court has been much more direct in

declaring that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel.' 32 The Court in the landmark case of Gideon v.
Wainwright 133 held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel to

protect indigent felony defendants in state criminal trials. 134 In Reece v.
Georgia,'13 the Court held that the right to assistance of counsel is the

right to effective assistance of counsel. 136 Finally, in Argersinger v. Ham127. See supra note 108.
128. 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1978).
129. Id. at 119-20.
130. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984). For articles discussing the
right to testify, see Hammerman, A Criminal Defendant's ConstitutionalRight to Testify - The
Implications of UnitedStates ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 23 VILL. L. REV. 678 (1977); Popper, supra
note 110; Note, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's UnilateralWaiver of the Defendant'sRight to Testify, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 517 (1976).
131. See supra note 120.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
. . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense."); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
(stating that the purpose of the sixth amendment is to "ensure a fair trial"); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972). In United States v. Wade, the Court extended the right to effective assistance of
counsel to the time before trial to protect the accused from the prosecution during the entire process
of defense. 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967). Earlier, in Douglas v. California, the Court extended the right
to effective assistance of counsel to post-trial proceedings to protect the rights of the defendant on
appeal. 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963).
133. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
134. Id. "[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id. at 344.
135. 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
136. Id. at 90. "The effective assistance of counsel in [a capital case] is a constitutional requirement of due process which no member of the Union may disregard." Id. (emphasis added). The
right to effective assistance of counsel was expanded to include felony convictions in McMann v.
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the Court recognized that the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to any offense which involves a potential sentence of
imprisonment.1 38 Because every criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court needed to establish some standards
to determine if a criminal defendant has been denied effective assistance
of counsel.
lin, 137

4.

Standard For Effective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, 139 the Court established a two-pronged
test to judge whether an attorney provided effective assistance of counsel.

The first step requires the defendant to show "that counsel's performance
was deficient."'

40

The second step requires the defendant to show "that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 14 ' In setting down
this test, the Court claimed to be giving meaning to the constitutional
requirement of effective assistance of counsel - "to ensure a fair
1 42

trial."'

The Court went on to adopt a standard for determining whether a
counsel's representation was deficient. Instead of enumerating a list of
mechanical rules, the Court employed a balancing test. A defendant will
succeed in a showing of deficient counsel if counsel's conduct was so ineffective as to undermine the adversarial process and result in an unjust
outcome.' 4 3 This balancing test will apply to all cases whether civil,
criminal, or capital.'" Various factors the Court will consider when
judging whether counsel's representation was deficient include the duty
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). "[D]efendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective
assistance of competent counsel." Id. at 771 (emphasis added); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932) (wherein the Court held that the trial court has the duty to appoint an attorney for the
accused).
137. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
138. "[A~bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial." Id. at 37.
139. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). For a more detailed discussion of Strickland, see Note, Sixth Amendment - Defendant's Dual Burden in Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 755 (1984); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Sixth Amendment Guarantees Assistance of
Counsel that is Reasonably Effective and Does Not Prejudice the Fairnessof the Proceeding, 14 U.
BALT. L. REV. 335 (1985).
140. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The standard for determining the reasonableness of an attorney's representation is an objective standard. Id. at 688.
141. Id. at 687.
142. "The benchmark for judging any claim of effectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result."Id. at 686.
143. Id. at 681.
144. Id. at 686.
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of counsel to be loyal and honest with his client, the duty to keep his
client informed about the progress of the case, and the duty to consult
with his client on important decisions. 145 Of course, the Court will evaluate the skill and knowledge employed by the attorney to advocate the
client's case at trial.'4 6 While the codes have obviously influenced the
Court's choice of factors, the justices caution that the codes are not exhaustive and should only be used as guidelines in light of the "variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions" open to the discretion of the attorney. 147 In essence, the Court
gave wide deference to the decisions of the attorney because of the dangers of twenty-twenty hindsight and to respect counsel's independence.14 1 Using this rationale, the Court will presume the attorney's
performance meets constitutional muster unless the defendant can show
that his attorney's representation falls outside reasonable professional

assistance. 149
Should the defendant satisfy the first prong, that the conduct of his
attorney was deficient, the defendant must still satisfy the second prong,
that the errant conduct prejudiced the outcome of the trial.1 5 Every
error will have some effect on the trial, but unless the defendant shows
with a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different" any deficient
representation will be considered harmless.'
The Court in Strickland
then discussed some practical considerations that will control judicial re52
view of client representation.'
145. Id. at 688.
146. Id.
147. Id. "Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and
the like .... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides." Id.
148. Id. at 689.
149. Id. The Court did say that prejudice will automatically be presumed in cases where no
counsel is appointed either actually or constructively, where the state has interfered with counsel's
assistance, and where there is a conflict of interest. Id.
150. Id. at 693. "It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 694-95. The practical considerations the court mentioned are: (1) the rules for reviewing attorney representation are not mechanical, (2) the rules "do not require reconsideration of
ineffectiveness claims" (3) the rules "should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on
direct appeal or in motions for a new trial," and (4) a state court finding that a counsel rendered
effective assistance of counsel, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment, "is not a
finding of fact binding on the federal court." Id.
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IV.

ANALYSIS

In light of conflicting decisions of the federal and state courts, and
the lack of clear guidance from the codes, it was only a matter of time
before the United States Supreme Court had to resolve some of the conflicts. The decision of the Eighth Circuit in Whiteside v. Scurr'5 3 almost
forced the Supreme Court to settle the dispute and they granted certiorari.1 54 The decision of the Supreme Court in Nix v. Whiteside answered
some of the conflicting issues, but left others unanswered while leaving
clues as to how they should or might be decided given the occasion.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Nix v. Whiteside was a limited
unanimous decision. The best way to analyze the case is to start with
those premises upon which all of the justices agreed and proceed to examine the significance of the similarities and differences. Chief Justice
Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justices Brennan and Stevens filed
concurring opinions and Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens filed a concurring opinion. The decisions of the
Justices of the Supreme Court represent the debate between the Truth
Seekers and the Adversaries.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Nix v. Whiteside was whether
Whiteside's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated
when his attorney, Robinson, refused to cooperate in presenting perjured
testimony at trial.55 The nine Justices agreed that Whiteside's rights to
56
stanassistance of counsel were not compromised under the Strickland"
157 The Court,
dard by his attorney's refusal to present false testimony.
however, was sharply divided over the rationale supporting their conclusions. The dispute centers on the application of the Strickland standard
to the issues.'5 8
Blackmun's concurring opinion limits the issue to whether the defendant had been deprived of a fair trial, not whether the attorney behaved ethically.' 59 Blackmun's opinion focuses entirely on whether the
defendant successfully proved attorney prejudice and whether that preju153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
mun, J.,
158.
159.

744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984).
Nix, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985).
Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 992.
Strickland v. washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 999; id. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 1004, 1006-07 (Blackconcurring); id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Compare Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 994, with 106 S. Ct. at 1003.
Id. at 1002, 1006.
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dice deprived him of a fair trial. There is no discussion of attorney ethics
with the exception of the observation that the Supreme Court is the
"wrong audience" to decide what rules govern attorney conduct. 160
Thus, Blackmun left ethical questions to the "differing approaches" of
the states, 16 1 and reserves the constitutional question of a criminal de62
fendant's sixth amendment right for the Court.'
Having delegated the issues to their proper place, Blackmun pointed
out what he sees as an inconsistency in the opinion of the Court. When
applying the Strickland standard, he believed that the Court must first
determine whether counsel's performance prejudiced the right of the defendant to a fair trial before determining whether counsel's performance
was unethical. 163 The reasoning supporting this approach to the issue is
twofold: first, it may be easier, 16 and second, and most important, "it
avoids unnecessary federal interference in a State's regulation of its
bar." 1 65 Blackmun's interpretation of the Strickland standard appeals to
traditional notions of federalism.
In contrast, Blackmun believed that the Court erred by first determining "the perimeters of [the] range of reasonable professional assistance."' 166 Blackmun's concern is that state and federal courts will
consider the discussion of the standards of professional responsibility an
implicit adoption by the Supreme Court. 16 7 He felt that the discussion of
the professional standards was an unnecessary infringement of state authority which could have been avoided by resolving the federal issue of
sixth amendment rights.
Should the precise issue of attorney ethics ever come before Justice
Blackmun, he left clues on how he would probably approach it. In his
concurring opinion, he clearly echoed several principles of the majority
opinion. "All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice ... it
tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial."' 68 Further, the
privilege every criminal defendant has to testify in his own defense
"'cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.' ",169
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1006.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1003 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697).
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1004.
Id. (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225).
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These two statements strongly suggest that Justice Blackmun belongs in
the camp of the Truth Seekers, and when squarely confronted with the
issue of whether the attorney's ethical obligation to the court is superior
to the attorney's ethical obligation to preserve client confidences, he
would side with the former.
Finally, assume for the moment that Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion is the opinion of the Court. Although he never discussed the
professional standards of conduct and is critical of interfering with a
"[s]tate's regulation of its bar," 170 he did rule out that possibility altogether. In fact, by holding that Robinson's representation did not violate
his client's constitutional rights to assistance of counsel,17 1 it is arguable
that he and all the Justices who joined his opinion, with the exception of
Justice Brennan, tacitly adopted the standards of professional responsibility, at least as guidelines. Robinson modeled his response to his client's proposal of perjury after the Model Rules.' 72 After reading
Blackmun's opinion, a practicing attorney when faced with a client intending to commit perjury would be forced to follow Robinson's example
to protect his ethical obligations while preserving his client's constitutional rights. In short, Blackmun's concurring opinion stands as a beacon to federalism while it tacitly says as much as the Court's 73 opinion.
Justice Blackmun was content with disposing of the issue in Whiteside by resolving the federal question and putting the underlying issues of
attorney ethics off for another day. By restricting his opinion, he missed
an important opportunity to resolve competing issues which have clearly
troubled many courts.
Justice Stevens, in his own concurring opinion, stated that "because
I do not understand [Justice Blackmun] to imply any adverse criticism of
this lawyer's representation," he therefore fell in line with Justice Blackmun. Every lawyer will follow Robinson's model and point to Justice
Steven's language, "it is now pellucidly clear that the client suffered no

'legally cognizable prejudice.'

"174

Although Justice Brennan joins Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion, he carefully qualified his position in his concurring opinion.
Brennan expressly stated that he did not tacitly adopt Robinson's con170. Id. at 1006.
171. Id. at 1006-07.
172. MODEL. RuLEs, supra note 7, at Rule 3.3 comment (1983). "[T]he lawyer should seek to
persuade the client to refrain from perjurious testimony .... ." Id.
173. Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 1007.
174. Id.
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duct as a role model. "[L]et there be no mistake: the Court's essay regarding what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client's
suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse without force of
law."17' 5 Brennan had clearly reserved his judgment on ethical conduct
for another day. An attorney reading Justice Brennan's opinion on the
matter, as it stands, would be left with a conclusion without any guidelines or rationale supporting the conclusion.
The Strickland standard presents a "chicken or the egg" type of
choice. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his concurring opinion, the
Court applies the Strickland standard with an eye toward first determining if Robinson's representation was prejudicial. Does the Court first
determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial, or does the
Court have to first decide if the attorney's representation was prejudicial
to make an intelligent decision on whether the defendant was denied a
fair trial? Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, apparently believed the latter was a more logical choice. "We must determine whether
• . . Robinson's conduct fell within the wide range of professional responses to threatened client perjury acceptable under the Sixth Amendment."' 7 6 Under Strickland, the wide range of professional responses
depends on "[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association Standards and the like .. . ."I" The Court was cautious in
Strickland and again in Nix v. Whiteside, to point out there are no
mechanical rules and that the professional standards of conduct serve
merely as guidelines. 178 Moreover, the Court's opinion expressly stated
it "must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable
under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the
State's proper authority . .. ,
With this qualification, the Court
clearly stated the professional standards of conduct were not being constitutionalized and avoids infringing on state sovereignty. The court was
not required to close its eyes to experience behind the professional standards of conduct.
To the chagrin of the Adversaries, the Court strongly supported the
arguments of the Truth Seekers and resolved most of the competing ethical obligations toward that end. The premise of the Court's argument
'.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1000.
994.
994 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
994.
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was that the duty of the defense attorney to advocate his client's cause is
"limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of
a trial as a search for truth."'8 0 Assisting a client in presenting false
evidence or otherwise violating the law has not and will not be condoned
by the Court. To support the decision, the Court cited to the first Canons of Professional Ethics, ' 8 ' and the sections of the Model Code, 82 and
the Model Rules' 8 3 discussed above. The Court also noted the shift in
the rules toward favoring disclosure of client perjury. 184 The Supreme
Court has unequivocally stated that an attorney faced with a criminal
defendant intending to commit 5perjury has a superior duty toward the
court that requires disclosure.1
The Court then addressed how such disclosure affects the criminal
defendant's sixth amendment constitutional rights. 186 This part of the
Court's opinion responds to the Adversaries' contention that an attorney,
in an adversarial system, must maintain all privileged information to protect the rights of his client. The Court again acknowledged the right of a
defendant to testify in his own behalf,'87 but reiterated that this right
does not include the right to testify falsely.18 8 Thus, when an attorney
threatens to disclose intended perjury and withdraw from the case,
thereby giving his client a choice between no representation and truthful
testimony, the attorney does not impermissibly impede the client's right
to testify. 8 9 Likewise, the Court said that the sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel does not include the right to have counsel "cooperate with planned perjury."' 19 A lawyer doing so would run the risk of
prosecution for subornation of perjury and suspension or disbarment.'' 9
An attorney refusing to participate in the presentation of false testimony
would not violate his client's sixth amendment right. 9 2 By deciding that
a criminal defendant does not have a right to perjure himself nor a right
to counsel who would cooperate with planned perjury, the Court refuted
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

994-95.
995-96.
966 n.6.
995-96.
993, 997-99.
993.
998.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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the argument of the Adversaries that disclosure would jeopardize a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Nix v. Whiteside directly answered the question of whether Robinson's conduct violated his criminal
defendant's sixth amendment and due process rights. The Court's opinion also appeared to resolve many of the dilemmas an attorney faces
when a client intends to present false testimony. The facts of the case,
however, did not warrant the Court's review of many tougher issues
which come up from time to time in client perjury cases. The Nix decision can even be classified as one of the easier client perjury scenarios,
because the client did not perjure himself on the stand and the case did
not cover the extremely controversial issue of attorney withdrawal.
Robinson merely threatened his client with withdrawal from the case.' 93
The Supreme Court has yet to be confronted with the worst case scenario
in which the attorney requests withdrawal because the indigent defendant, over his attorney's advice, gave false testimony but the judge denied
94
the request because withdrawal would hamper the defendant's case.'
In such a case, the attorney and the defendant would make strange partners in a strained fiduciary relationship. The Court understated the complexity by saying, "[w]ithdrawal of counsel when this situation arises at
trial gives rise to many difficult questions including possible mistrial and
195
claims of double jeopardy."'
V.

CONCLUSION

In Nix v. Whiteside, the Supreme Court clearly stated that a criminal defendant does not have a right to testify falsely and that an attorney
must disclose intended client perjury in criminal cases. Because the
criminal defendant does not have a right to testify falsely, disclosure of
intended perjury will not violate the defendant's sixth amendment and
due process rights. Moreover, accepting that a criminal defendant does
not have a right to testify falsely, the Adversaries cannot claim that confidentiality will protect the rights of a criminal defendant. The Supreme
Court's strong statements that a trial is a truth-seeking process suggest
that the failure to disclose intended client perjury is a violation of present
American concepts of due process. The opinion does fall in line with the
majority of cases and the trend in professional ethics. While the Court
193. MomI'I Rul.ns, supra note 7, at Rule 3.3 comment.
194. Id.
195. Nix, 106 S.Ct. at 996.
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considered the trial a truth-seeking process, the Court limited its decision
to the issue of intended client perjury. Scholars of legal ethics at least
now have some insight as to how the Court may decide more complex
scenarios. But for now, the dilemma of intended client perjury has been
resolved in favor of the Truth Seekers. No doubt there will be a great
outcry from the Adversaries in the future.
Robert Davis Young
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